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Beyond Sympathy: Smith’s Rejection of Hume’s Moral Theory 
 
Paul Sagar 
King’s College, Cambridge 
 
* 
 
Introduction 
 
Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) was a publishing success in its author’s 
lifetime, going through six authorised editions in Britain, and gaining appreciative readers 
in France and Germany as well. Its fortunes after Smith’s death were not, however, 
sustained. For a long time TMS lay largely forgotten, before being press-ganged into the 
so-called ‘Das Adam Smith Problem’ associated with German scholars of the latter 19th 
Century.1 Happily, matters have recently once again been reversed. The ‘Das Adam 
Smith Problem’ has largely been left behind as an interpretative wrong turn, and Smith’s 
moral philosophy is today the focus of healthy interest in its own right.2 
Yet despite this welcome redux a core feature of Smith’s moral theory in TMS 
remains largely unappreciated. This concerns the nature of Smith’s engagement with the 
account of moral foundations put forward by his friend and philosophical forerunner, 
David Hume. Certainly, the relationship between Smith and Hume on this score has 
attracted scholarly attention. But with regards to the foundations of morals, this has so 
far focused upon Smith and Hume’s rival accounts of ‘sympathy’ (Raynor 1984; Darwall 
1998, 264-70; 1999, 141-5; Otteson 2002, 30-9; Broadie 2006; Fleischacker 2012; Sayre-
McCord 2013; for a holistic overview, Hanley 2016). Yet as I will show, disagreement 
over sympathy is only the starting point of Smith’s engagement with Hume’s account of 
the foundations of morals. My central contention is that the argument of TMS can be 
                                                        
1 For a classic formulation of the ‘Problem’, Oncken 1897. Despite the misguided nature of the original 
‘Problem’, it may nonetheless constitute the historical origin of serious contemporary analysis of Smith 
(Tribe 2008). 
2 This may be illustrated by reference to the sheer number of monographs now available concerning 
Smith’s moral-philosophical thought, for example Campbell 1971; Brown 1994; Griswold 1999; 
Fleischacker 1999, 2004; Otteson 2002; Raphael 2007; Hanley 2009; Forman-Barzilai 2010.    
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understood as in part a rejection of Hume’s division of the virtues into ‘artificial’ and 
‘natural’.3 Although both thinkers agreed that morality was fundamentally a purely 
human construction – the product of imaginative psychological processes combined with 
the capacity to share the sentiments of others (Griswold 1999, 155-73) – Smith’s vitiation 
of Hume’s bifurcation was the backbone of an attempt to reject the older philosopher’s 
central system, replacing it with that of TMS. Whilst Smith thought that Hume was 
working with the right materials in attempting to construct an account of morality based 
in the passions, and in particular the operations of sympathy, he judged that Hume’s way 
of assembling these materials was not correct. Smith’s ambition was not only to offer a 
moral theory that he thought was correct, but to stake a claim to having offered the most 
plausible sentimentalist theory then available. In practice, this meant one that was 
superior to Hume’s. Doing so, however, would require moving Hume’s theory off of the 
philosophical territory that it had staked, claiming it for Smith’s instead. Thus a major 
ambition of TMS was to reject and replace Hume’s earlier sentimentalist account. 
My argument proceeds in four main sections. The first recapitulates Hume’s 
theory of the virtues in the Treatise of Human Nature. The second examines Smith’s claim 
that even the supposed ‘natural’ virtues have to be understood in terms of fundamental 
social composition. The third examines Smith’s treatment of justice – Hume’s paradigm 
artificial virtue – and presents the younger Scot’s treatment as a technical modification 
within sociability theory, revealing an ineliminable natural foundation. The fourth 
considers the place of Hume’s Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals and his emphasis 
                                                        
3 Istvan Hont suggests that ‘Smith applied the explanatory mechanism offered by Hume’s theory of the 
origin of justice to the rise of moral rules in society in general’, the implication being that Smith rendered 
all of the virtues artificial (Hont 2015, 35). As we shall see, this is not quite right: Smith is better read as 
fundamentally problematizing any artificial/natural distinction, and thereby moving beyond Hume’s terms 
of analysis. Similarly, James Otteson suggests that Hume imperfectly anticipated Smith’s emphasis on the 
emergence of spontaneous order in moral affairs (Otteson 2002, 120-1). But this does not, I aim to show, 
adequately capture the extent of Smith’s ambition and corrective. Furthermore, as Ryan Patrick Hanley has 
pointed out to me, Smith seems to take over wholesale Hume’s distinction between the awful and amiable 
virtues, which renders their relationship even more complex. This paper, however, will focus only on their 
disagreements about moral foundations, leaving discussion of the typology of virtues for another time. 
 3 
there on the centrality of utility to moral appraisal, presenting Part IV of TMS as a critical 
response to Hume in the context of the corrective that Smith had already laid down in 
Parts I-III. I conclude by indicating the wider significance of these readings.  
 
Hume: Natural and Artificial Virtues 
Hume famously dismissed the possibility that moral distinctions are founded in any 
operation of reason, insisting instead that they arise from our ‘impressions’ rather than 
‘ideas’, meaning that ‘Morality…is more properly felt than judg’d of’ (Hume 2007, 
T3.1.2.1; SBN 470).4 Hume offered a sophisticated psychological hedonism whereby ‘An 
action, or sentiment, or character is laudable or blameable…because its view causes a 
pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind’. However, Hume did not think that we 
denote something virtuous simply because it pleases (or vicious simply because it pains), 
but rather that if something pleases ‘after such a particular manner, we in effect feel that 
it is virtuous’. Although he is notably under-spoken with regards to what exactly this 
‘particular manner’ consists of, Hume is clear that moral distinctions are effectively a 
form of taste, operating in an analogous manner to judgements of ‘beauty, and tastes, 
and sensations’, where ‘our approbation is implied in the immediate pleasure they convey 
to us’ (T.3.1.2.3; SBN 471).  
Central to Hume’s explication of morality is his positing of the human capacity 
for ‘sympathy’. A technical term, sympathy denotes the process of turning the ‘idea’ of 
another’s affective state into an ‘impression’: we literally come to share each other’s 
sentiments, transforming the imagined passions of another ‘into the very passion itself’ 
(T.2.1.11.3; SBN 317; cf. Darwall 1999, 144). This capacity underpins all morality, 
because it is by coming to hold the idea of another’s pain or pleasure as our own that we 
                                                        
4 I here give only a schematic overview of Hume’s theory. For more detailed treatments see the relevant 
chapters in Cohon 2008, Wright 2009. 
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can get outside of our private viewpoints and have affective – and hence, moral – 
responses to the doings of those who do not directly impact us. Furthermore, however, 
for Hume judgements of moral taste are not ultimately trained on action, but on the 
underlying motive or character that actions are taken to be signs of (Hume 2007, 
T.3.2.1.1-4; SBN 477-8; T. 3.3.1.4; SBN 575). When we observe others, we take their 
actions to reveal their motives or characters, and if those give us pleasure or pain after a 
‘particular manner’, we pronounce the action to be good or bad, the motive or character 
virtuous or vicious.  
Hume divides the virtues in turn into ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’. The ‘natural’, 
despite coming later in the Treatise presentation, are the easiest to account for. They are 
those that, upon observing, we receive a sense of pleasure, and thus immediately feel a 
corresponding approbation towards the relevant agent(s) regarding. Due to our capacity 
to sympathise we can easily attribute virtue (or vice) to others, even when their actions in 
no way affect us personally. A paradigm case might be benevolence: observing Agent A 
do a good deed to Agent B, and inferring that A’s motivation was simply to aid B, this 
gives rise to a feeling of pleasure via sympathy with both the motive of the agent and the 
benefit of the recipient, and thus we denominate such behaviour virtuous. In other 
words: natural virtues are those that upon simple observation give rise to the sentiments 
of pleasure peculiarly associated with moral approbation (Hume 2007; T.3.3.1.1-12; SBN 
574-80). 
The artificial virtues are more complex. These cover cases where simple 
observation of a putative act of virtue would not generate the feelings of pleasure 
required to constitute virtue, absent some relevant established background convention. 
Although Hume lists ‘allegiance…the laws of nations…modesty, and…good-manners’ as 
instances of artificial virtues, his paradigm case is justice (T.3.3.1.9; SBN 577). Imagining 
a putative act of justice – say, returning a sum of money owed to another – if one 
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considers the act in isolation, it is not clear why doing such a thing would be virtuous. 
What if the creditor is an enemy, or a miser, or intended to do wicked things with the 
money; or the debtor a poor and desperate person in great need of the sum owed? Hume 
claims that regarding such cases, if taken in isolation, we cannot say why an act of 
putative justice would indeed be a virtue, insofar as the motive underlying the act of 
repayment may give rise to pain rather than pleasure. To account for the virtue we must 
post an established background convention whereby such acts of justice have come to be 
seen as required, and hence the contemplation of their fulfillment gives pleasure in a 
virtue-denoting manner. 
Hume’s explication of how the background convention of justice comes into 
being is complex, and not without interpretative difficulty, but its main features can be 
summarised as follows.5 Although lacking any notion of justice in primordial conditions 
of small-scale family living, primitive humans learned that unrestrained indulgence of 
self-interest (capaciously understood to include that of kin) led to violations of the 
holding of possessions, which created a general instability that disadvantaged all. 
Realising that each would benefit by reciprocal abstention from seizing the goods of 
others, men developed conventions of forbearance, although these arose spontaneously 
and without explicit agreement (in Hume’s famous example, like two men rowing a boat 
without express agreement to cooperate: T.3.2.2.10; SBN 490). Justice was thus originally 
a convention rooted in self-interest, and was attended only by what Hume called a 
‘natural’ obligation, i.e. regard to one’s own specific interest in upholding the convention. 
Over time, however, the ‘natural’ obligation was supplemented with a ‘moral’ one, which 
made reference not to the self-interested advantages of adherence, but to belief in its 
normative validity. This was a function of sympathy: human beings came to sympathise 
                                                        
5 For an effective summary of Hume’s theory of justice, which helpfully corrects some common 
misreadings, Baldwin 2004. 
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with the pain of those who suffered violations of the conventions of justice, and also 
with the hurt inflicted on society tout court by convention-violating behaviour. Pain at the 
violation of the conventions of justice, and pleasure at their being upheld, meant that 
what started out as a convention rooted in self-interest transitioned into fully-fledged 
moral virtue (T.3.2.2.23-6; SBN 498-501). 
Hume’s account of the artificial virtues was not a sceptical or debunking one.6 
Although justice (and the other artificial virtues) had a genetic origin in conventions of 
self-interest, and only later achieved the status of moral virtue proper, this genetic history 
had no bearing on present normative validity – not least because it was entirely natural 
for mankind, an ‘inventive species’, to develop artifices (T.3.2.1.19; SBN 484). The 
natural and the artificial virtues were on a par when considered in ordinary life, insofar as 
all virtue could ultimately be captured via a four-fold classification of whatever was either 
useful or agreeable to self or others (T.3.3.1.29-30; SBN 590-1). Furthermore, Hume 
claimed that individuals eventually came to make assessments of virtue from ‘some steady 
and general points of view’, abstracted from their specific situations or sentiments, which 
enabled him to account for the typically disinterested and universalist nature of ordinary 
moral judgements (T.3.3.1.15; SB 581-2). Ultimately, the only thing that distinguished the 
artificial from the natural virtues in daily practice was that whereas every instantiation of 
a natural virtue gave rise to utility or agreeableness to oneself or another, and hence 
always generated the pleasure required for the ascription of virtue, isolated instances of 
the artificial virtues might not, and it was only against the background existence of the 
relevant convention that the requisite pleasure could arise (T.3.3.1.12; SBN 579). In both 
cases, however, our capacity to sympathise with the pains and pleasures of others 
underwrote the ascription of virtue or vice. 
                                                        
6 It was thus, at least in part, a rejection of the sceptical debunking theory of Bernard Mandeville. Hume 
denied both that ‘politicians’ could be the primary source of our distinctions between vice and virtue or 
that revealing the artificial genesis of (some of) our virtue concepts impugned their normative validity. For 
detailed treatments see Hundert 1994, 75-86; Wright 2009, chapter 9; Harris 2015, 121-41). 
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Smith: The Social Composition of Virtue 
With this schematic summary of Hume’s moral theory in place, we can turn to compare 
Smith’s alternative in TMS. Like Hume, Smith made a capacity for sympathy central to 
his theory of morals. But as is well recognised, their accounts differed in important ways 
(Darwall 1998, 264-70; Otteson 2002, 30-9; Fleischacker 2012). The main points of 
contrast may be summarised as follows.7  
Smith’s conception of sympathy is more wide-ranging than Hume’s, denoting 
‘our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever’ (Smith 1976, I.i.I.5). This can range from 
Hume-esque cases of imagining that the pains or pleasures of another are one’s own (e.g. 
in cases of simple observation and transference, such as recoiling at the blow about to hit 
another) to much more complex cases of imaginative interchanging, such as 
sympathizing with the dead by picturing what the dead would feel were they conscious of 
being burred in the cold, wet, worm-filled ground. Crucially, Smith insists that sympathy 
is not primarily about imagining what an observed agent is experiencing and replicating 
that affective state as an observer, but about imaginatively changing places with the agent 
and considering what we would feel were we them, in their situation: ‘Sympathy, 
therefore, does not arise so much from the view of the passion, as from that of the 
situation which excites it’ (I.i.I.10). Darwall has suggested that this difference can be 
captured by saying that whilst for Hume sympathy is ‘third-personal’ and based always 
on a spectatorial standpoint detached from those one is observing, for Smith sympathy is 
‘second-personal’ insofar as we imaginatively project ourselves into the situations of 
others. On Hume’s account, we mechanistically transform the ‘idea’ of another’s emotive 
state into an ‘impression’ of our own, but for Smith we project ourselves into the 
                                                        
7 For more detailed discussions of Smith’s account of sympathy: Broadie 2006; Brown 2012; Fleischacker 
2012; Griswold 2006, 1999; Nanay 2010; Otteson 2002; Sayre-McCord 2013.  
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circumstances of another, and examine what we would feel were we actually them 
(Darwall 1998; 1999). 
Smith builds his moral theory on what he takes to be a crucial upshot of our 
capacity to imaginatively trade places with others. He tells us that ‘nothing pleases us 
more than to observe in other men a fellow-feeling with all the emotions of our own 
breast; nor are we ever so much shocked as by the appearance of the contrary’ (Smith 
1976, I.i.2.I). When we enter imaginatively into the situation of others, if we find a 
correspondence between the way that we imagine we would feel were we them, and the 
way we believe that they actually feel, then this correspondence automatically pleases. By 
contrast if we find that there is a lack of congruence between how we imagine we would 
feel, and how we think that they do feel, then we are pained (as in both cases is the other 
party). Smith claims that this specific form of pleasure or pain via mutual or absent 
sympathy is the basis of moral approbation or disapprobation (I.i.2.1-6; I.iii.I.9). 
 It is worth noting that in offering this explication Smith was providing a more 
thorough account of the ‘particular manner’ by which pleasure grounds moral taste than 
Hume had provided. Yet Hume famously disagreed with Smith’s account of sympathy, 
claiming that despite being the ‘hinge’ of the younger man’s system, it was false insofar as 
it could not make sense of the phenomenon of painful sympathy (Hume 1932a, 313). I 
shall touch on this matter in the conclusion, but for now I put aside Hume’s complaint 
about the technical workings of Smith’s sympathy theory and suggest that Smith’s ‘hinge’ 
opened the door to a thoroughgoing rejection of Hume’s account, extending beyond a 
rival account of fellow-feeling alone. 
We can begin to see this by first briefly reviewing Smith’s own moral theory. 
Smith divides moral judgement into two general parts:  
[T]he sentiment or affection of the heart, from which any action proceeds, and upon 
which its whole virtue or vice depends, may be considered under two different aspects, 
or in two different relations: first, in relation to the cause or object which excites it; and 
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secondly, in relation to the end which it proposes, or to the effect which it tends to 
produce. (II.i.Introduction.2; cf. I.i.3.5-7) 
The first class of virtues falls under the heading of ‘propriety’, the second under ‘merit 
and demerit’. Smith dedicates Parts I and II of TMS to the analysis of each respectively, 
claiming that judgements of the personal comportment and moral desert of others track 
processes of imaginative situation-switching, and the presence or absence of mutual 
sympathy that arises thereby. Part III aims to show how we come in turn to judge our own 
conduct, by adopting the perspective of an ‘impartial spectator’: that in Smith’s 
memorable phrase, ‘I divide myself, as it were, into two persons; and that I, the examiner 
and judge, represent a different character from that other I, the person whose conduct is 
examined and judged of’ (III.I.6). In all cases, essential to Smith’s analysis is the process 
by which we imaginatively enter into the situation of others (or ourselves considered as 
another) and examine the extent to which a correspondence of feelings arises, with moral 
approbation or disapprobation the result of mutual or discordant sympathy.  
 We can now begin to appreciate the subtle but significant differences that Smith 
proposes as compared to Hume’s theory. In the first instance, on Smith’s account the 
capacity to construct a complex, third-personal perspective such as the impartial 
spectator – as well as the more basic capacity to bring one’s sentiments into line with 
what others can be expected to go along with as in cases of propriety and merit – 
requires moral agents to have considerable experience of judging and being judged by 
others. From the outset Smith insists that both judging others, and modulating one’s 
sentiments in response to or anticipation of being judged, requires awareness of differing 
perspectives, achieved via repeat social interaction. He insists that ‘Every faculty in one 
man is the measure by which he judges of the like faculty in another. I judge of your 
sight by my sight, of your ear by my ear, of your reason by my reason, of your 
resentment by my resentment, of your love by my love’ (I.i.3.10) Because we can have no 
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direct experience of other people’s experiences, we can only learn what they think of us 
by honing the faculty of the imagination through repeat social interactions, which 
informs us of the accuracy or shortcomings of our own judgements, from the physical-
sensory right through to the complexly cognitive-evaluative (Griswold 2006). Agents are 
‘continually placing themselves’ in the situation of spectators, ‘and thence conceiving 
emotions similar to what he feels; so he is as constantly placing himself in theirs’ (Smith 
1976, I.i.4.8). It is through this constant process of judging and being judged that men 
are all insensibly aware of what Smith calls, in a subtle modification of, and supplement 
to, Christianity’s golden rule, ‘the great precept of nature’: ‘to love ourselves only as we 
love our neighbour, or what comes to the same thing, as our neighbour is capable of 
loving us’ (Smith 1976, I.i.5.5). 
Already this marks an important contrast with Hume, for whom neither the 
natural nor the artificial virtues required judgement pertaining to the perspective of other 
agents, but simply observation coupled with the capacity to transform the idea of 
another’s affective state into an impression (Sayre-McCord 2013). Yet Smith goes further 
than simply suggesting an alternative theory of morals to that offered by Hume. He 
challenges the basic viability of Hume’s account.  
We can see this by turning to TMS Part III, considering Smith’s claim that:  
Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary 
place, without any communication with his own species, he could no more think of his 
own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, of the 
beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his own face. 
All these are objects which he cannot easily see, which naturally he does not look at, and 
with regards to which he is provided with no mirror which can present them to his view. 
Bring him into society, and he is immediately provided with the mirror he wanted before 
(III.1.3). 
This passage is best read as Smith’s applying to all of the virtues the thought experiment 
that Hume in the Treatise employed with regards to justice: imagining a hypothetical state 
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of nature, and asking whether a virtue concept could there have any coherent content. 
Hume was clear in his discussion of justice that the state of nature was a ‘mere 
philosophical fiction’ (T.3.2.2.14; SBN 493): in reality humans had originally subsisted in 
families and tribes, never as isolated competitors. But the state of nature was nonetheless 
a useful thought experiment precisely because it so clearly illustrated the artificial nature 
of virtue. Absent relevant background conventions a savage in such a condition could 
have no comprehension of justice – proof that it was artificial in provenance, even if the 
state of nature had never actually obtained. 
Smith took this insight but applied it to all of the virtues, including the putatively 
natural ones. Like Hume, Smith was conjecturing a ‘mere philosophical fiction’, but one 
which nonetheless had important theoretical payout. In actuality, man was naturally 
indigent and needy, requiring group support to achieve maturity (II.ii.3.1). Smith’s 
locution ‘Were it possible…’ should be read as an indication that it was not possible for 
solitary humans to successfully grow up to ‘manhood’. (cf. Otteson 2002, 69). But 
imagining such a hypothetical creature allowed Smith to make two points. First, and as 
he explicitly stated, that having no experience of being judged or judging in turn, this 
creature would lack the concepts of vice and virtue, the ‘natural’ as much as the 
‘artificial’. But secondly, and connectedly, even if such a solitary creature were brought 
into society and provided with the ‘mirror’ required to make sense of his own conduct 
and character, such an individual would not possess the active capacity to use this mirror, 
because it would be lacking in the background experience of judging and being judged 
that constituted a necessary pre-requisite of knowing what the mirror is, let alone how to 
use it. 
Smith was here making an analytic point about the necessary preconditions for 
possessing moral capacities, not a literal causal claim about how a solitary man could 
acquire concepts of virtue and vice and the capacity for moral judgement. In reality all 
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normal humans first learned to regulate their sentiments, and thus to grasp the concepts 
of propriety and merit – and eventually personal duty – as children, where they ‘enter the 
great school of self-command’ beginning ‘to exercise over [their] own feelings a 
discipline which the practice of the longest life is very seldom sufficient to bring to 
complete perfection’ (III.3.22): 
We become anxious to know how far we deserve their censure or applause, and whether 
to them we must necessarily appear those agreeable or disagreeable creatures which they 
represent us. We begin, upon this account, to examine our own passions and conduct, 
and to consider how these must appear to them, by considering how they would appear 
to us if in that situation. We suppose ourselves the spectators of our own behaviour, and 
endeavour to imagine what effect it would, in this light, produce upon us. This is the 
only looking-glass by which we can, in some measure, with the eyes of other people, 
scrutinize the propriety of our own conduct. (III.1.5)  
It is only by experience of living in society that we can become sensitive to the 
sentiments of others, and learn to engage successfully in the complex social codes that 
have already accreted on that foundation, after the passing of many generations, and long 
before we as individuals learn to live morally in the here and now. Nonetheless, 
hypothesizing a solitary individual in the state of nature revealed that morality could only 
be understood as fundamentally social in composition. It thus made no sense to talk of 
‘natural’ virtues. In a state of nature, virtues could no more be ‘natural’ than ‘artificial’. 
It might be tempting to conclude that Smith therefore rendered all of the virtues 
artificial, especially given that he took over Hume’s state of nature procedure but applied 
it more widely. This, however, is best resisted. First, Smith never describes the virtues as 
artificial (or, for that matter, natural), which is significant given that he knew Hume’s 
earlier account, and thus had such a distinction readily available to him. Second, although 
Smith insists that virtue concepts are irreducibly rooted in experience of social 
phenomena, this process is not best described as ‘artificial’ because (and taking the 
Humean spirit to its logical conclusion) it is, Smith thinks, natural for humans to engage 
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in the interactive social processes that gave rise to morality. Third, just because all of the 
virtues presuppose social composition, this does not mean that they are founded in 
conventions of the sort that Hume posited with regards to the artificial virtues in the 
Treatise, which are (for him at least) the hallmark of artificiality. Finally, and as the next 
section will attempt to show, Smith expressly problematizes Hume’s paradigm case of 
justice as an artificial virtue, arguing instead that it must have a foundation in the natural 
impulse of resentment.  
 
Smith: The Natural Foundations of Justice 
Before considering Smith’s treatment of justice in TMS Part II, it is important to bear in 
mind two things. First, that Hume’s account of justice in the Treatise, when placed in its 
proper eighteenth century context, is not simply an explication of how justice can be 
made sense of as a moral virtue, but is simultaneously a theory of human sociability for 
large and lasting conditions, situated in a debate inherited from Hobbes and transmitted 
with especial force and provocation by Mandeville (Hundert 1994, chapter 2; Robertson 
2005, chapter 6). Second, that despite some commentators representing Smith’s 
relationship to Hume on the question of justice as one of overall disagreement (e.g. 
Shaver 2006; Pack and Schliesser 2006), Smith was in fact in broad agreement with Hume’s 
theoretical position regarding sociability, even if he thought that technical aspects of 
Hume’s argument needed alteration. As a result, Smith’s reply to Hume on the question 
of justice in TMS is Janus-faced. On the one hand, it contains a sharp technical 
corrective regarding the details of Hume’s case in sociability theory, but which Smith 
nonetheless endorsed overall. On the other, the upshot of Smith’s technical corrective 
was to undermine Hume’s foundational distinction between the natural and artificial 
virtues, and in turn serve to reject Hume’s theory of the foundations of morals in favour 
of Smith’s. This will become clearer in what follows. 
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  Hume’s treatment of justice should be read, following Hont (1994, 2005a), as a 
theory of ‘commercial sociability’.8 This constitutes a halfway house between the pride-
centered accounts of Hobbes and Mandeville that denied any natural sociability for large 
and lasting conditions, and theories such as those of Shaftesbury, Butler, and Hutcheson, 
that posited a natural capacity to form large-scale human groupings out of natural 
sentiment alone. Hume denied Hobbes and Mandeville’s claim that humans were 
incapacitated for large-scale living by the ravages of competitive esteem-seeking (what 
Rousseau would later label amour propre): ‘All the other passions, besides this of interest, 
are either easily restrain’d, or are not of such pernicious consequence, when indulg’d. 
Vanity is rather to be esteem’d a social passion, and a bond of union among men (Hume 
2007, T.3.2.2.12; SBN 491). But he agreed that large-scale society could not be generated 
out of natural materials alone without the aid of artifice. Limited generosity and 
reasonable self-interest would generate co-ordination problems whereby self-interested 
seizure of the goods of others, if left unchecked, would destabilize the capacity for large-
scale group living. Large and lasting society was thus not undermined (as Hobbes and 
Mandeville contended) by the pursuit of the satisfaction of pride (competitive status-
seeking), but of material advantage. The solution to this predicament was the invention 
of the conventions that first gave rise to justice, in turn generating the institutions of 
magistracy (originally learned through primitive international war), and eventually 
government tout court (Hume 2007, T.3.2.6-7; SBN 526-39). Large and lasting society 
rested on artifice, but not that suggested by either Hobbes (overawing sovereign power) 
or Mandeville (deception by legislators redirecting pride into socially-beneficial pursuits 
through the invention of counterfeit morality and codes of honour). It was the artificial 
virtue of justice that rendered humans fit for large and lasting society. 
                                                        
8 This is neither Hume nor Smith’s term, however, and it is interesting to note that neither of them 
explicitly uses the language of sociability. Why this might be is a good question, but I nonetheless agree 
with Hont that both are theorists of sociability (and part of a quasi-Hobbesian legacy).  
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Smith agreed with Hume that it was utility, not pride, that needed to be artificially 
regulated in order to establish large and lasting society, and that this could be accounted 
for only by the conventions of justice (Hont 1994, 2005b). Although a society bounded 
together by mutual benevolence would be the happiest, nonetheless ‘though among the 
different members of the society there should be no mutual love and affection, the 
society, though less happy and agreeable, will not necessarily be dissolved’. This was 
because a ‘Society may subsist among different men…from a sense of its utility, without 
any mutual love or affection’ (Smith 1976, II.ii.3.2). The regulation of possessions 
allowing mutual interactions for reciprocal gain was central to the promotion of mutual 
utility, and thus the capacity for forming large and lasting societies. Smith agreed with 
Hume that justice, insofar as it facilitated this process, was ‘the main pillar that upholds 
the whole edifice. If it is removed, the great, the immense fabric of human society…must 
in a moment crumble into atoms’ (II.ii.3.3).9 Certainly, Hume did not think that justice 
operated in isolation when it came to complex advanced societies: the artificial virtue of 
allegiance undergirded the stability of stratified systems of rule (Hume 2007, T.3.2.7-10; 
SBN 534-67; Sagar 2016), whilst artificial codes of politeness enabled individuals to 
engage with each other in mutually tolerable fashion (Hume 2007, T.3.3.2-3; SBN 592-
606; Harris 2015, 51-65, 121-142). Nonetheless, justice was necessary for achieving 
successful group living and could only be furthered by, but not replaced with, these other 
artifices – something Hume sought to make clear when he asserted that whilst ‘it be 
possible for men to maintain a small uncultivated society without government, ’tis 
impossible they shou’d maintain a society of any kind without justice’ (Hume 2007, 
T.3.2.8.3; SBN 541). Smith essentially agreed with this point, whilst incorporating and 
refining a view of socially-composed artificial politeness in his discussion of the virtues 
                                                        
9 For more extensive discussions of Smith’s view of justice, see Griswold 1999, chapter 6; Fleischacker 
2004, chapter 8. 
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headed under ‘propriety’. This was signaled by his calling justice the ‘main pillar’ that 
upheld the whole social edifice, even if other factors (such as the willingness to defer to 
established patterns of authority) were also relevant (Smith 1976, I.iii.2.1-9).  
Where Smith disagreed with Hume was in the technical foundations of the claim 
that justice was necessary for the maintenance of large and lasting society. Against Hume 
he argued that there must be certain in-built checks to men’s pursuit of self-interest, not 
just the artificially developed external checks Hume located in group conventions. This 
must be the case, or else large-scale society would never have been possible at all. ‘Men, 
though naturally sympathetic, feel so little for another, with whom they have no 
particular connexion, in comparison to what they feel for themselves’, that if presented 
with opportunities to disposes others of their goods, they would do so most readily if the 
principles of justice ‘did not stand up within them’ and ‘overawe them into respect’ for 
the innocence of others prior to the establishment of any external rule. On Hume’s 
picture – although Hume himself had failed to see this – in advance of the emergence of 
the conventions of justice, ‘a man would enter an assembly of men as he enters a den of 
lions’ (II.ii.3.3). But this meant that the very conventions Hume posited could never have 
emerged in the first place, and hence his theory fell short of an adequate explanation. 
There must, Smith contended, be some pre-conventional internal corrective to 
the pursuit of self-interest, upon which the conventional structure of operative justice 
was ultimately built. Smith identified two such foundations. The first grew out of his 
wider conception of the virtues as irreducibly socially composed. Although every man ‘is 
much more deeply interested in whatever immediately concerns himself, than in what 
concerns any other man’, no individual would dare look another in the face and affirm 
that he ‘naturally prefers himself to all mankind’, and act according to this principle 
(II.ii.2.1). Long experience of judging and being judged caused men to modify their 
conduct with regards to self-interest. Thus although every individual would in the 
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abstract like to take whatever he pleased from others if it promoted his own ends, in 
practice the sympathy of spectators with the victims of dispossession rebounded upon 
the perpetrator, who came to feel remorse if judged by others to have engaged in such 
behaviour. Accordingly men came to view such behaviour as impermissible, with 
intuitively grasped collective rules set down regarding permitted conduct in matters of 
self-promotion. Smith illustrated this via the metaphor of a race in which each is allowed 
‘to run as hard as he can, and strain every nerve and every muscle, in order to outstrip his 
competitors’ but is not permitted to ‘jostle, to throw them down’. Doing so would incur 
the condemnation of the ‘spectators’, who readily ‘sympathize with the natural 
resentment of the injured’ – the ultimate source of the rules of the great race of self-
advancement (II.ii.2.1). 
The second foundation Smith identified grew out of his observation that a sense 
of demerit was originally and always conjoined with a desire for the punishment of 
wrongdoers (merit, conversely, was annexed to the idea of reward) (II.i.1.1-7). This was a 
basic psychological fact about socialised human beings, but it had special import with 
regards to justice. ‘Nature has implanted in the human breast that consciousness of ill-
desert, those terrors of merited punishment which attend upon its violation, as the great 
safe-guard of the association of mankind, to protect the weak, to curb the violent, and to 
chastise the guilty’ (II.ii.3.4). Acts of self-preferment that issued in acquisitive aggression, 
and hence violated the rules of proper conduct, were automatically viewed by spectators 
as instances of demerit. Those spectators desired, and would typically seek, the 
punishment of perpetrators. This punishment (spontaneous and collectively-sanctioned 
in more primitive conditions) would itself be an effective check against such behaviour. 
But furthermore, the psychological experience of judging and being judged would mean 
that most individuals would internalize a desire not to engage in illicit acquisition because 
of their own experience of negatively judging others who did so, desiring their 
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punishment, and concluding that they would likewise deserve punishment if engaging in 
such behaviour, which they spontaneously sought to avoid. 
Hence there was a two-fold, mutually reinforcing, foundation to the virtue of 
justice, which existed in men’s hearts after they were living in groups and morally 
socialised, but prior to the establishment of external conventions of self-interest for 
regulating property. In failing to appreciate this Hume confused the ‘efficient’ with the 
‘final’ cause when explaining the origins of that virtue (II.ii.3.5). He mistakenly inferred 
that because justice was the most fundamental prerequisite of, and facilitator for, the 
collective pursuit of utility, so a direct regard for utility must be the main causal 
explanation for the phenomenon of justice. As we saw above, Hume tried to make this 
claim more plausible by suggesting that individuals sympathized with public utility when 
approving of the relevant conventions. Smith likened this explanation to believing that 
because a watch tells the time, all the individual parts that enable it to do so conspire 
consciously in this end – which of course they do not (II.ii.3.5). Justice was certainly the 
pillar that upheld the mutual pursuit of utility, and thus of large and lasting society, but 
the individual ‘parts’ that made this possible did not have this end in view. ‘All men, even 
the most stupid and unthinking, abhor fraud, perfidy, and injustice, and delight to see 
them punished. But few men have reflected upon the necessity of justice to the existence 
of society, how obvious soever that necessity may appear to be’ (II.ii.3.9).  
Smith capped his critique with a series of further examples to prove that a direct 
regard for utility was not the proper explanation, even if the promotion of utility was the 
ultimate function of the rules of justice. These included the regard we have for 
individuals quite independent of their relationship to a wider multitude; the relative 
unusualness of punishing solely for the regard to aggregated consequences (such as 
executing the sleeping sentinel pour encourager les autres); the outrage we feel at a murderer 
or thief who goes unpunished yet does not again go on to harm society; and the universal 
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human religious belief that there must be ‘a Tartarus as well as an Elysium; a place 
provided for the punishment of the wicked, as well as one for the reward of the just’, 
reflecting men’s desire that wrong-doers who get away with their crimes be punished 
even after they are dead and can no longer obstruct society’s pursuit of utility (II.ii.3.12). 
Yet Smith’s central criticism of Hume’s theory of justice as an artificial virtue was that it 
neglected the inbuilt pre-conventional checks to rapacious behaviour that were located in 
human moral capacities, and that made men aware of the virtue of justice long before the 
establishment of self-interested conventions, and indeed made such later conventions 
possible at all. Hume’s flagship case of justice could not properly be considered as 
artificial all the way down. 
This generated at least two consequences. First, Smith’s corrective indicated that 
if Hume’s wider commercial sociability framework was to pass muster at the level of 
technical detail, then the natural/artificial heuristic would have to be abandoned when 
attempting to correctly explain the origin of justice, and hence of large and lasting 
society. Second, and in part as a consequence, Smith should be read as fundamentally 
problematizing the coherence of any natural/artificial bifurcation tout court. Not only 
were there no ‘natural’ virtues in the state of nature, but justice, the paradigm case of an 
‘artificial’ virtue, turned out to be explicable only through appeals to non-conventional 
features located in natural human affections (especially resentment and the desire to 
punish). In other words, explaining the foundations of morality required a level of 
integrated complexity that went beyond Hume’s division of natural and artificial. But 
given that the natural/artificial distinction was central to Hume’s account of the 
foundations of morals, the corresponding implication was that Hume’s theory was not 
able to achieve what was ultimately required. 
 
Utility and the Second Enquiry 
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It might be objected that I have thus far focused exclusively on Hume’s theory of morals 
as presented in the Treatise, but that Smith would also have been familiar with Hume’s 
argument in the 1751 Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, which does not make 
central a distinction between artificial and natural virtues, and which at least appears to 
change, or even substantively abandon, Hume’s account of sympathy (e.g. Van Holthoon 
1993; Abramson 2001; Vitz 2004). Can it be right to read the TMS of 1759 as (at least in 
part) a worked-out reply to the Treatise, rather than the Enquiry?  
Several things should be said on this score. First, that although it is true that 
Smith would have known the Enquiry by the time he published TMS, it is also probable 
that he had begun to work out his own positions long before that work appeared. We 
know that Smith read the Treatise whilst an unhappy visiting undergraduate at Balliol 
College, Oxford from 1740-6, and it is therefore unlikely that his response to Hume 
would have been trained, at its core, exclusively on the later iteration of Hume’s theory 
(Phillipson 2010, 64-5). Second, it is anyway incorrect to claim that Hume radically 
changed his positions between the Treatise and the Enquiry. As Remy Debes has shown in 
an important pair of articles, although Hume altered his presentation and emphasis in the 
Enquiry, the underlying moral theory – especially with regards to the functioning of 
sympathy – remains continuous with that of the Treatise (Debes 2007a, 2007b). Similarly, 
although Hume abandons the terminology of natural and artificial virtues in the Enquiry, it 
does not follow that he changed his fundamental account. Section 3, ‘Of Justice’, and 
‘Appendix 3: Some Farther Considerations with Regard to Justice’, maintain the same 
fundamental account of the origins of justice versus that of ‘benevolence and its 
subdivisions’. Hume continued to affirm that justice was founded in conventions, and 
understood as ‘a sense of common interest; which sense each man feels in his own breast, 
which he remarks in his fellows, and which carries him, in concurrence with others, into 
a general plan or system of actions, which tends to public utility’ (Hume 1998, A3.5; SBN 
 21 
306). He likely dropped the terminology of ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’, however, because 
despite attempts to forestall misunderstanding this had led his readers into confusion, as 
his famous letter to Francis Hutcheson illustrates.10 In any case, Hume’s settled position, 
clearly stated in the Enquiry as in the Treatise, is that whatever their particular genesis, all 
virtue could at root be defined as that ‘which is useful or agreeable to the person himself or to 
others’, with vice the reverse (Hume 1998, 9.12; SBN 277; cf. 9.1; SBN 268). 
Where the Enquiry perhaps does differ is with regard to the emphasis Hume puts 
on utility as the source of moral approbation. In addition to an entire section entitled 
‘Why Utility Pleases’, Hume states that utility is ‘the sole origin of justice’ and the sole 
foundation for our moral approval for that virtue (3.1; SBN 183); that public utility is the 
primary reason we believe there to be ‘a natural beauty and amiableness’ even amidst 
‘uninstructed mankind’ with regard to the social virtues (5.4; SBN 214-5); and that the 
extent to which we find things agreeable to ourselves is in fact rather limited, and we are 
more frequently interested in what is useful (Section 7, passim). In the Enquiry Hume 
stresses that the bulk of our moral judgements are generated by a sense not of the 
agreeable, but of the useful, where our capacity for sympathy ties us together through an 
ability to take pleasure in the attainment of utility not just for ourselves, but our peers. 
We should perhaps be wary of overstating the differences between the Treatise 
and the Enquiry on this matter.11 Nonetheless, if we grant that in the later work Hume 
committed himself more fully to an endorsement of utility as the main foundation of 
moral approbation, we can see Part IV of TMS, ‘Of the Effect of Utility on the 
Sentiment of Approbation’, not only as a corresponding rejection of Hume’s specific 
                                                        
10 See especially Hume 2007, T.3.2.2.19; SBN 484 and T.3.2.6.11; SBN 533-4, which make clear that the 
distinction between artificial and natural virtues is a heuristic device, without independent normative 
import. In a letter replying to an original correspondence that is now lost, Hume wrote Hutcheson ‘I have 
never called justice unnatural, but only artificial’ – indicating that Hutcheson rather refused to take the 
point (Hume 1932b, 33).  
11 Hume, after all, is clear in the Treatise that it is utility, rather than agreeableness, which ‘determine all the 
great lines of our duty’ (T.3.3.1.27; SBN 589-90). 
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arguments (as is already well recognised), but, when coupled with Smith’s earlier rejection 
of the distinction between artificial and natural virtues, as an attempt at the rejection of 
Hume’s earlier theory so as to make room for Smith’s rival account.12  
Part IV of TMS is a direct reply to Hume, that ‘ingenuous and agreeable 
philosopher’ who has ‘of late’ attempted to explain ‘why utility pleases’ (Smith 1976, 
IV.1.2). Chapter 1 sees Smith begin by taking issue with Hume’s claim that we desire 
external objects for the actual utility that they bring, in turn offering his own alternative 
theory in its place. Smith argued that a quirk of human psychology causes us to be 
excessively dazzled and preoccupied with the means of promoting utility, rather than with 
utility itself. Furthermore, what we sympathize with in others is not the actual utility 
derived from their goods and circumstances, but the pleasure we imagine that others 
should feel given that they are equipped with extensive and well-contrived means of 
pleasure-promotion. We admire the rich and powerful not because, as Hume had 
claimed, we sympathize (in the ‘ideas’ into ‘impressions’ sense) with their actual 
pleasures, but because we take pleasure in the correspondence of sentiments with what 
we imagine they ought to feel when entering imaginatively into their situation (compare 
Hume 2007, T.2.2.5.13-14; SBN.362 with Smith 1976, IV.1.3-9). This explained why, 
despite the fact that the rich and famous are typically not in fact made happy by their 
riches and fame, most people nonetheless esteem and emulate their social and economic 
superiors. (It also leads to the strange irony that ‘the beggar, who suns himself by the side 
of the highway, possess the security which kings are fighting for’ (Smith 1976, IV.1.10)). 
Yet according to Smith it is ‘well that nature imposes upon us in this manner. It is this 
deception which rouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind’. Esteem 
and emulation arising from the imagination of pleasure that could be attained (and not 
                                                        
12 Whether Smith added Part IV of TMS as a result of reading the Enquiry, or whether he would have 
written and included it even if Hume’s later rendering had never appeared, is a question we cannot answer 
given the known historical sources. Fortunately, it does not bear upon the present argument either way. 
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from the actual securing of utility) was the great spur to human industry. It was what 
prompted men to leave the indolence of their primitive conditions, and eventually to 
‘found cities and commonwealths, and to invent and improve all the sciences and arts, 
which ennoble and embellish human life’ (IV.1.10). Human civilization was founded 
upon not just unintended consequences (Otteson 2002, 121-2), but a quirk of human 
psychology that the cold reason of sober philosophy struggled to endorse, and yet which 
constituted the lynchpin of collective human material progress.  
Smith’s diagnosis of the neuroses of economic consumption was highly original, 
and indeed he himself claimed that the phenomenon he identified ‘has not, as far as I 
know, been yet taken notice of by any body’ (Smith 1976, IV.I.3). It certainly went 
beyond anything found in Hume, and meant that Smith’s attitude towards economic 
consumption, and its ties to moral psychology and in turn the capacity for, and 
manifestation of, virtue, also played out differently (Diatkine 2010; Sagar forthcoming). 
In particular, Smith went on to be more preoccupied and troubled than Hume had been 
by the dynamics of, and possibilities for, moral corruption in commercial society. 
Whereas both thinkers analysed it, Smith went much further in critiquing it. In particular, 
Smith worried more than Hume about the tendency for sympathy to make us unduly 
deferential and submissive to the whims of the rich and powerful, in turn helping to 
generate the socially corrosive contagion of vanity, and not just the more benign effects 
of deference to authority (Smith 1976, I.iii.2.III; cf. Hanley 2008, but also Sagar 
forthcoming).  
Having set out his own stall in Chapter 2 of Part IV, Smith trained his sights on 
Hume’s specific arguments, presenting his own account of propriety and merit as better 
equipped to explain approbation or disapprobation than Hume’s arguments from utility 
(Smith 1976, IV.2.4-11). Underlying Smith’s series of case-by-case counterexamples, 
however, was a reaffirmation of his central claim from Part III: that all virtue was socially 
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composed, rooted in experience of repeat interactions with judging others. Smith again 
redeployed Hume’s procedure of hypothesizing a state of nature situation to explore the 
coherence of a value concept, this time applying it specifically to the connection between 
utility and approbation: 
[So] far as the sentiment of approbation arises from the perception of this beauty of 
utility, it has no reference of any kind to the sentiments of others. If it was possible, 
therefore, that a person should grow up to manhood without any communication with 
society, his own actions might, notwithstanding, be agreeable or disagreeable to him on 
account of their tendency to his happiness or disadvantage (IV.2.12). 
 
But if men really were solitary (this again being a heuristic device, not a literal claim about 
how men might ever have been), they would in fact not form the ideas of vice and virtue, 
even though they might have the idea of utility: 
As these perceptions, however, are merely a matter of taste, and have all the feebleness 
and delicacy of that species of perceptions, upon the justness of which what is properly 
called taste is founded, they probably would not be much attended to by one in this 
solitary and miserable condition. Even though they should occur to him, they would be 
no means have the same effect upon him, antecedent to his connexion with society, 
which they would have in consequence of that connexion…All such sentiments suppose 
the idea of some other being, who is the natural judge of the person that feels them; and 
it is only by sympathy with the decisions of this arbiter of his conduct, that he can 
conceive, either the triumph of self-applause, or the shame of self-condemnation 
(IV.2.12). 
In other words, utility could only have the effects Hume wished to claim for it if 
something like Smith’s account of the virtues was already in place. But if that account 
was in place, Hume’s explanation of utility as the dominant feature in our moral 
judgements was redundant. What did the work was imagining our self into the situations 
of others and comparing sentiments, with approbation and disapprobation arising 
accordingly. 
 It might be thought with Raynor (1984, 59-60) that Smith unfairly misrepresents 
Hume by focusing in Part IV exclusively on utility, when Hume is clear that 
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agreeableness is also a part of virtue. But this is to fail to appreciate the deft pincer 
maneuver Smith has deployed. Parts I-III of TMS sought to establish that with regards 
the foundations of morals Hume had no viable independent theory of the immediately 
agreeable to self or others: any working account of that phenomenon must adopt Smith’s 
account of the fundamental social composition of the virtues. Granting Smith’s case 
from Parts I-III, all that Hume could have left was the suggestion that considerations of 
utility form the bulk of the explanations for our moral sentiments. What Part IV seeks to 
establish is that this is not a viable explanation of the foundations of morality, either: the 
role of utility can be coherently admitted only on the terms established by Smith’s 
alternative moral theory, which operates by repudiating Hume’s central distinction 
between the natural and artificial virtues. The result that Smith leaves his readers to infer 
is that Hume’s theory must be abandoned in favour of the one they are simultaneously 
being presented with. Smith thus sought to reject, and then replace, Hume’s arguments, 
whilst operating on the same theoretical ground, and with the same basic materials, that 
the older philosopher had first put forward. 
 
Conclusion 
Why did Smith leave these results to be inferred, rather than stating them directly? We 
will never know for sure, but at least three likely explanations are available, which also 
give us reason to think that the above reading is not impugned by the fact that Smith 
never explicitly affirms it. The first is that Smith did not wish to draw too much attention 
to his engagement with – and by turns, potential proximity too – Hume’s ideas, given the 
latter’s unwelcome status in Scottish intellectual circles, the misunderstandings that 
tended to attach to Hume’s arguments, and Smith’s desire to retain a professional 
university post of the sort conspicuously denied to Hume. Smith’s attempted rejection of 
Hume operated by emphasizing the irreducible social construction of morality – and 
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hence potentially put Smith closer to the bêtes noir of Mandeville and Hobbes, in the eyes 
of his contemporaries, than even Hume had been taken to be. From Smith’s perspective 
it was surely better not to call explicit attention to this, although Thomas Reid certainly 
noticed the rough trajectory of Smith’s thought when he (erroneously, but revealingly) 
declared TMS to be ‘only a Refinement of the selfish System’ (Reid 1997). Smith never 
mentions Hume by name in TMS, despite it being clear to an informed and attentive 
reader that he engaged thoroughly with Hume’s ideas. Given Smith’s unwillingness to 
even mention Hume by name, it is hardly surprising that he left the implications of his 
rejection of Hume’s controversial moral theory to be inferred.  
The second reason is simply that the two thinkers were friends, and Smith may 
have preferred not to state publicly or explicitly his view that the other’s framework was 
fundamentally untenable. Sufficiently informed and intelligent readers (including Hume 
himself) could work this out; the rest did not need attention drawing to the matter in a 
way that might generate animosity or allegations of an open rift. Third, Smith may not 
have wanted to draw attention away from criticism of other thinkers he thought more 
misguided than Hume, and that he opposed more directly. Smith didn’t think that anybody 
had adequately theorized our moral sentiments before TMS, and Hume had at least 
gotten further than the rest, and been using the right materials. Hence, better not to slow 
the progress of wider learning by focusing too much attention on a mistaken account 
that had at least helped make Smith’s cutting-edge intervention possible, undue focus 
upon which might distract from Smith’s positive interventions which were anyway 
designed to get beyond the problems Smith had identified in Hume’s account.13  
If the reading suggested by this paper is correct, there are both philosophical and 
historical consequences to consider. On the historical side, the most important upshot is 
that Hume’s foundational moral theory turns out to have been answered in his own 
                                                        
13 I am grateful to Robin Douglass for this final point. 
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lifetime by a powerful and accurate philosophical interlocutor, one who both understood 
and accurately engaged Hume’s positions, not just piecemeal but systematically and in the 
round. Although Hume’s moral theory was subsequently subjected to attack by James 
Balfour (1753) and James Beattie (1770), as well as (somewhat) less splenetically by 
Thomas Reid (1783), their engagements do not address the true nature of Hume’s 
arguments, but concentrate fire on caricatures and misreadings, generating little of 
philosophical substance. Smith, by contrast, understood Hume’s theory very precisely, 
and constructed a response that was a serious and profound challenge to its viability. 
In philosophical matters, implications are generated for how we respectively 
place Hume and Smith as pioneers of ethical sentimentalist theories, and what that 
means in turn. One thing that I have tried to indicate is that the differences between 
Hume and Smith are not exhausted at the level of specific disagreements over sympathy, 
or the nature of justice, or of the role of utility, taken in isolation, but that these together 
are facets of a more fundamental attempt by Smith to reject Hume’s moral theory, in 
order to replace it with his own.14 Yet this suggests that conventional assessments of 
Hume and Smith may mistakenly give pride of place to an inferior, and near-
contemporaneously surpassed, moral theory. It is still Hume, and not Smith, who takes 
precedent on undergraduate reading lists in ethics and the history of moral philosophy, 
and who is treated by many contemporary scholars as the greatest historical exponent of 
sentimentalist ethics, serving as the primary inspiration for more recent attempts to 
                                                        
14 In particular I have left aside the question of whether Hume was right that although Smith’s revised 
conception of sympathy was the ‘hinge’ of his system, it was nonetheless a false account – the implication 
perhaps being that Smith’s entire system failed in turn (e.g. Raynor 1984). As it happens, I agree with 
Fleischacker (2012, 300-3) that Smith has the resources to answer Hume (whose criticisms are misplaced), 
and that the younger Scot has the better of things with regards the plausibility of his theory of sympathy. 
This stands against the more prevalent view that Hume has identified a crucial flaw in Smith’s apparatus 
(Raynor 1984, 56-9; Blackburn 1998, 203-4; Broadie 2006, 170-4). But in any case what I hope to have 
indicated is that even if Hume was right that Smith’s account of sympathy suffered from a specific technical 
failing, Smith still had at his disposal a much wider theoretical reconfiguration that served as a systematic 
rejoinder to Hume. On the challenges in making good on Smith’s theory as an empirically viable account 
of fellow-feeling, however, see Heath 1995 (but also Otteson 2002, 128-33); McHugh 2011. 
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produce ethical theories based on the passions rather than reason.15 Yet if the above is 
correct, this may be a mistake. That it was Smith, not Hume, who offered the 
Enlightenment’s most advanced – and perhaps in turn most plausible – sentimentalist 
ethical theory. If so, we ought to seriously reconsider both how we teach, and how we 
research, both moral philosophy and its history.  
 
Acknowledgements: This essay was first drafted whilst I was a visiting scholar at the 
University of California at Berkeley in early 2016. I am extremely grateful to Kinch 
Hoekstra for supporting that visit, and thus providing the time and space for me to 
work through my ideas. He, Mark Fisher, Nick Gooding, Dan Lee, Johan Olsthoorn, 
and Rosie Wagner, all provided helpful comments on an earlier version of this article. 
Special thanks must also go to Hallvard Lillehammer, who provided generous and 
insightful feedback at every stage of this argument’s gestation. Robin Douglass (once 
again) offered me critical direction of the highest caliber. Ryan Patrick Hanley offered 
helpful comments and support. I would also like to thank the Journal’s anonymous 
reviewers for their direction and support. More unusually, I would also like to thank 
two anonymous reviewers for the Journal of the History of Philosophy, who (rightly) 
rejected a much earlier and very inadequate version of these ideas, but in the process 
helped me to see how to put right what I was getting wrong. Finally, I thank the 
Provost and Fellows of King’s College for their continued generosity, collegiality, and 
support.  
 
References 
- Abramson, Kate. 2001. “Sympathy and the Project of Hume’s Second Inquiry,” Archiv für 
Geschichte der Philosophie 83 (1): 45-80. doi: 10.1515/agph.83.1.45 
 
- Baldwin, Jason. 2004. “Hume’s Knave and the Interests of Justice,” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 42 (3): 277-296. 
 
- Balfour, James. 1753. A Delineation of the Nature and Obligation of Morality, with Reflexions 
upon Mr. Hume's Book Entitled An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. 
Edinburgh. 
 
- Beattie, James. 1770. An Essay on The Nature and Immutability of Truth In Opposition to 
Sophistry and Scepticism. Edinburgh. 
 
- Blackburn, Simon. 1998. Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
- Broadie, Alexander. 2006. “Sympathy and the Impartial Spectator,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Adam Smith, edited by Knud Haakonssen, 158-88. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
                                                        
15 To pick a few examples: Blackburn 1998; Prinz 2007; Joyce 2007; Slote 2010. A recent work which starts 
from something like Smith’s second personal approach is of course Darwall 2006, although I would 
contend that the motivation and goal in that work is ultimately Kantian and rationalist, not Smithean and 
sentimentalist.  
 29 
 
- Brown, Vivienne. 1994. Adam Smith’s Discourse: Canonicity, Commerce and Conscience. 
London: Routledge.  
 
2012. “Intersubjectivity and Moral Judgement in Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral 
Sentiments,” in Intersubjectivity and Objectivity in Adam Smith and Edmund Husserl: A Collection 
of Essays, edited by Christel Fricke and Dagfinn Føllesdal, 243-72. Berlin/Boston: De 
Gruyter. 
 
- Campbell, T.D. 1977. Adam Smith’s Science of Morals. London: Allen and Unwin. 
 
- Cohon, Rachel. 2008. Hume’s Morality: Feeling and Fabrication. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
- Darwall, Stephen. 1998. “Empathy, Sympathy, Care.” Philosophical Studies 89 (2-3): 261-
82. doi: 10.1023/A:1004289113917 
 
1999. “Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam Smith.” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 28 (2): 139-64. doi: 10.1111/j.1088-4963.1999.00139.x  
 
2006. The Second Person Standpoint. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard. 
 
- Diatkine, Daniel. “Vanity and the Love of System in Theory of Moral Sentiments,” The 
European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 17 (3): 383-404. doi: 
10.1080/09672560903204924 
 
- Debes, Remy. 2007a. “Humanity, Sympathy and the Puzzle of Hume’s Second Enquiry,”, 
British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15 (1): 27-57. doi: 10.1080/09608780601087954 
 
2007b. “Has anything changed? Hume’s Theory of Assosciation and Sympathy after the 
Treatise,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15 (2): 313-38. doi: 
10.1080/09608780701240040 
 
- Fleischacker, Samuel. 1999. A Third Concept of Liberty: Judgment and Freedom in Kant and 
Adam Smith. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
2004. On Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations: A Philosophical Companion. Princeton. 
Princeton University Press. 
 
2012. “Sympathy in Hume and Smith: A Contrast, Critique, and Reconstruction”, in 
Intersubjectivity and Objectivity in Adam Smith and Edmund Husserl: A Collection of Essays, 
edited by Christel Fricke and Dagfinn Føllesdal, 273-311. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter.  
 
- Forman-Barzilai, Fonna. 2010. Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy: Cosmopolitanism and 
Moral Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
- Griswold. Charles L. 1999 Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
2006. ‘Imagination: Morals. Science, and Arts’, in The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith, 
edited by Knud Haakonssen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 22-56. 
 
- Hanley, Ryan Patrick. 2008. “Commerce and Corruption: Rousseau’s Diagnosis and 
Adam Smith’s Cure,” European Journal of Political Theory 7 (2): 137-58.  
 30 
doi: 10.1177/1474885107086445 
2009. Adam Smith and the Character of Virtue. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
2016. ‘Hume and Smith on Moral Philosophy, in The Oxford Handbook of Hume, edited by 
Paul Russell. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 708-28. 
 
- Harris, James. 2015. Hume: An Intellectual Biography. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
- Heath, Eugene. 1995. “The Commerce of Sympathy: Adam Smith and the Emergence of 
Morals,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 33 (3): 447-66. doi: 10.1353/hph.1995.0049. 
 
- Hont, Istvan. 1994. “Commercial Society and Political Theory in the Eighteenth 
Century: The Problem of Authority in David Hume and Adam Smith.” in Main Trends in 
Cultural History: Ten Essays, edited by W. Melching and W. Velema. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 
54-94. 
 
2005a. “Jealousy of Trade: An Introduction”, in Jealousy of Trade: International Competition 
and the Nation State in Historical Perspective. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Harvard, 1-156. 
 
2005b. “The Language of Sociability and Commerce: Samuel Pufendorf and the 
Theoretical Foundations of the ‘Four Stages’ Theory”, in Jealousy of Trade: International 
Competition and the Nation State in Historical Perspective. Cambridge Mass: Belknap Harvard, 
159-84. 
 
2015. Politics in Commercial Society: Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Smith, edited by Bella 
Kapossy and Michael Sonenscher. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.   
 
- Hume, David. 1932a. ‘Letter to Adam Smith, July 1759,’ in Hume’s Letters: Volume 1, 
1727-65, edited by J.Y.T. Greig. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
1932b. ‘Letter to Francis Hutcheson, September 1739,’ in Hume’s Letters: Volume 1, 1727-
65, edited by J.Y.T. Greig. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
1998. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, edited by T. Beauchamp. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
2007. A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by D.F. Norton and M.J. Norton. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
- Hundert, E.J. 1994. The Enlightenment’s Fable: Bernard Mandeville and the Discovery of Society. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
- Joyce, Richard. 2006. The Evolution of Morality. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
 
- McHugh, John W. 2001. “Relaxing a Tension in Adam Smith’s Account of Sympathy,” 
Journal of Scottish Philosophy 9 (2): 189-204. doi: 10.3366/jsp.2001.0015. 
 
- Nanay, Bence. 2010. “Adam Smith’s concept of sympathy and its contemporary 
interpretations,” in The Philosophy of Adam Smith: The Adam Smith Review, vol. 5, Esssays to 
Commemorate the 250th Anniversary of the Theory of Moral Sentiments, edited by V. Brown and 
S. Fleischacker. London: Routledge, 85-105. 
 
- Oncken, August. 1897. “The Consistency of Adam Smith.” The Economic Journal 7 (27): 
443-50. doi: 10.2307/2957137  
 
 31 
- Otteson, James R. 2002. Adam Smith’s Marketplace of Life. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
- Pack, Spencer J. and Schliesser, Eric. 2006. “Smith’s Humean Criticism of Hume’s 
Account of the Origin of Justice,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (1): 47-63. doi: 
10.1353/hph.2006.0004 
 
- Phillipson, Nicholas. 2010. Adam Smith: An Enlightened Life. London: Allen Lane. 
 
- Prinz, Jesse J. 2007. The Emotional Construction of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
- Raphael, D.D. 2007. The Impartial Spectator: Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy. Oxford: 
Clarendon.  
 
- Raynor, David D. 1984. “Hume’s Abstract of Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral 
Sentiments.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 22 (1): 51-79. doi: 10.1353/hph.1984.0000  
 
- Reid, Thomas. 1783. Essays on the active powers of man. Edinburgh. 
1997. ‘Letter from Thomas Reid to Lord Kames’, in On Moral Sentiments: Contemporary 
Responses to Adam Smith, edited by John Reeder. Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 65-8. 
 
- Robertson, John. 2005. The Case for the Enlightenment: Scotland and Naples, 1680-1760. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
- Sagar, Paul. 2016 “The State Without Sovereignty: Authority and Obligation in Hume’s 
Political Philosophy.” History of Political Thought 37 (2): 271-305.  
Forthcoming. “Smith and Rousseau, After Hume and Mandeville”, Political Theory.  
 
- Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey. 2013. “Hume and Smith on Sympathy, Approbation, and 
Moral Judgement.” Social Philosophy and Policy 30 (1-2): 208-36. doi: 
10.1017/S0265052513000101 
 
- Shaver, Robert. 2006. “Virtue, Utility, and Rules”, in The Cambridge Companion to Adam 
Smith, edited by Knud Haakonssen, 189-213. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
- Slote, Michael. 2010. Moral Sentimentalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
- Tribe, Keith. 2008. “‘Das Adam Smith Problem’ and the origins of modern Smith 
scholarship.” History of European Ideas 34 (4): 514-525. doi: 
10.1016/j.histeuroideas.2008.02.001.  
 
- Van Holthoon, F.L. “Adam Smith and David Hume: With Sympathy,” Utilitas 5 (1): 35-
48. doi: 10.1017/S0953820800005525. 
 
- Vitz, Rico. 2004. “Sympathy and Benevolence in Hume’s Moral Psychology,” Journal of 
the History of Philosophy 42 (3): 261-75. doi: 10.1353/hph.2004.0059 
 
- Wright, John P. 2009. Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature: An Introduction. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
 
 
 32 
 
 
